Not I but movements superjecting landscapes of thought feelding

Encontré un viejo escrito que quería compartirles! How to move from these type of expressions: "I love..." or "I think..." or "The other day I found..." or "The other day I was thinking about..." into expressions that find more accuracy to a thought that thinks (Deleuze 1994, 132) both itself thinking and the inkling thinking movements of the puffiness of thought? In a Whiteheadian sense, how to move from a subject that feels an object to an "[a]ctual entity [that] is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experience" (Whitehead 29 emphasis added), from a subject that thinks to a thought that things*-thinks the ". . . how of the occasion account[ing] for itself, [toward] the subjectivity of the event (Manning 37), toward a subjective activity of the occasion of thought feeling, not after experience but during and from within it? How to move toward expressions for experience itself feeling its own experiencing? And how at the same time to sustain an elasticity from novel expressions that honour landscaping compositions of thought-feeling back to the "I love" forms of expressions? In the Guattarian and Deluzian spirit of strata and lines of flight, . . . variously formed matters, and very different . . . speeds . . . because it's nice to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows it's only a manner of speaking. To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I (3). What moves this proposition? A feeling that feels estranged. Expressions with an I in front of feel, feel strange. Not that "I feel them strange" but more that something feels them strange. The feeling after the I feels the I strange to it. Something feels. As if feeling would be a superjecting mechanism capable of managing to do the work itself always in relation to other self-sufficient superjecting mechanisms and always itself —the thinking-feeling— capable to multiply itself into many with its own imploding explosivity. While walking on this elastic, consider always that "[one] cannot abstract the universe from any entity . . . so as to consider that entity in complete isolation" (Whitehead 28). With this in mind, this proposition doesn't try to rip off the feeling away from the I but tries to move the I out for a ride from the amazing scene taking of thinking-feeling processes, which in a way are themselves the primary composites of any entity, even the entity I which when coming back from its ride may find itself in an ode to life, becoming so similar to the movements that move the thought thinking feelings of the earth and trees who also are entities in their compositional moves capable themselves to feel-think and express in relation to other movements. For an ecology of thought in the world and not as an exclusivity that belongs to a person! As in Mukhopadhyay's account of the flower-morning ecology with which a "story is trying to form" (Manning and Massumi 5): I could see the night jasmines wet with morning dew . . . trying to form a story with their jasmine petal smell. I would see the story spread in the air. . . I would see that the moment I put my shadow above the flower , the story would immediately stop forming. (as qtd. by Manning and Massumi 5) While Manning reminds us that ". . . where I stand . . . stops the process" (48) I wonder where does thought-feeling escape the I toward other type of expressions? Something in me, feels, thinks, finds, loves but not I. Something in me molecularly experiences fear. Pain finds its peculiar ways to deposit its morphing traits in some parts of me. It is not I that is in pain. Pain makes itself felt in relation to other superjecting surfacing super fixing mechanisms. This something that feels also feels the danger of this exploration. The danger of placing all responsibility in mechanisms of the feeling bodying-organism feeling. However, the bodying mechanisms of feeling also have a concern for the world so in no way there's a sense of non-responsibility. Yet, this approach may complexify the very popular question of "who did this?" Even the I is not one person. Even a text is not by one I. There's many in the one. Not many persons but many processes and as processes that may become "organisms that persons"(1-4), it may also be many persons. Some of these processes come to press themselves as pronouns. Maybe for rapid expressions as "where did you put the milk", "I put it in the fridge". Maybe then it works. Although to be honest even then, some times there's this feeling of the milk just making its way to the fridge somehow by the activation of some processes of a milk-fridge-morethanhand-conservation ecology. But even if simple expressions need the I, the pronoun doesn't work many times because it delimits the thing expressed to an I person that expresses and so erasing then the many processes at work. The constant use of I smashes down a complicity of processes in movement that take place all the time, landscaping all the time, conglomerating all the time, moving in a superjective geomorphology that forms blocs of intensity and "areas of sensation" (Bacon as quoted by Deleuze "Francis Bacon" 102) full of "random traits and scrubbed zones" (Deleuze "Francis Bacon" 110). Not that something in me wants to erase the I. But something in me needs to be acknowledged as movements themselves moving with their own rhythms, with the rhythms of the world through. Look. It is not I the one that talks. There's more than I to the talking and the thinking and the feeling and the one day. This proposition hopes to find the elasticity for a different understanding of things like "I think..." or "The other day I came to the realization that..." as mere shortcuts referring to a much more autonomous movement of though-feelding becoming not I but non-territorialized interminable landscapes of multiple layering de/formations, especially the non-visible-but-felt ones. And yes. Next time that someone asks why didn't I put the milk inside the fridge I would feel inclined to answer: "It wasn't me, it was the movements", what in spanish expresses itself some times in the well known phrase: "No fui yo fue Tete". In an account of a person as the movements of thought feelding, Tete in this account, is the superjecting movements of thought feelding fiddling becoming scarcely a landscaping caricature of the I! Note: *thing here as a "synonymous of entity" within the category of the Ultimate as a complex unity: Creativity, many, one; the many becoming one plus one. (Whitehead 21) ______ Deleuze Gilles. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Deleuze, Gilles. Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation. Trans. Daniel W. Smith. New York: Continuum, 2004. Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987 Gins, Madeline and Arakawa. Architectural Body. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2002. Manning, Erin. The Minor Gesture. Forthcoming. Manning, Erin and Brian Massumi. Thought in The Act. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. Whitehead, Alfred N. Process and Reality. New York: Free Press, 1978.